宋圭武观点51：  中国古代社会乡贤的产生也是一种均衡

所谓乡贤，一般指德才兼备并受到乡里人敬重的人。明代在选择乡贤时，除了考虑功德言之外，是否为官也是乡贤评定的必要条件。而到了清代，则把是否出仕，不再视为评定乡贤的必要条件。明清两代乡贤的确立，需要由地方公举，再经官方审核批准，然后进入乡贤祠。到了近代，北洋政府曾以官方名义，树立了一批乡贤。

在我国古代，产生了许多很有影响的乡贤。如北宋的范仲淹，为后世树立了乡贤的楷模。蓝田人吕大均也是乡贤的典型。吕大均制定并推行《吕氏乡约》，在蓝田地方进行推广。《吕氏乡约》是我国第一部成文乡约，影响后世千年。

从中国古代历史看，个人认为，乡贤的产生也是一种均衡。第一，乡贤的产生与我国古代村庄缺乏流动性密切相关。由于缺乏流动性，人与人之间的博弈就具有了长期特征，这有利于道德培育。因为在长期博弈的情况下，个体违规的成本是巨大的。另外，由于缺乏流动性，导致信息稀缺，这也为具有一定信息资源的人树立权威提供了更大可能。第二，与小农经济的经济基础密切相关。由于小农经济所提供的农业剩余有限，国家必然无法有效保障数量众多官员的报酬。但国家又不能缺少管理，在这种情况下，中国古代社会最终以皇权不下县的形式实现了这种管理经费不足条件下的管理均衡。古代中国最终借助两种力量实现了国家权力的下沉。一是借助制度的力量，如通过犯罪连坐制度以及酷刑制度等，通过这种制度设计极大激活了村民内部互相进行监督和管理的能量。二是借助乡贤的力量，即借助村里有威望的人参与管理，这既节省了管理费用，也提高了管理效率。第三，中国文化中重视亲情和乡情的元素是催生乡贤的文化动力。

但在乱世期间，则乡贤往往可能会被土豪劣绅所替代。因为在乱世，由于社会不稳定性大大增加，村庄的稳定性也会被打破，一些村民的短期行为就会增加。另外，在乱世，统治者为了恢复社会秩序，必然需要经济提供更大剩余，而要提取更大剩余，必然导致管理倾向竭泽而渔，不顾后果，这就容易催生村庄管理流氓地痞化。

好，谢谢，谢谢。

Song Guiwu's opinion 51: The emergence of town heroes in ancient Chinese society is also a kind of equilibrium

The so-called town heroes generally refer to people with both political integrity and talents who are respected by the people in the countryside.When selecting town heroes in the Ming Dynasty, in addition to considering the merits and virtues, whether they are officials is also a necessary condition for the evaluation of town heroes.But in the Qing Dynasty, whether they are officials is no longer regarded as a necessary condition for the evaluation of town heroes.The establishment of town heroes in the Ming and Qing Dynasties needs to be publicly announced by the local government, and then approved by the official examination and approval, and then enter the town heroes temple.In modern times, the Northern government set up a number of town heroes in the official name.In ancient China, there were many influential town heroes.For example, Fan Zhongyan in the Northern Song Dynasty set up a model of town heroes for later generations.Lantian's Lü Dajun is also a typical town hero.Lü Dajun formulated and implemented the "Lü's Town Agreement" and promoted it in Lantian.The "Lü's Town Agreement" is the first written town agreement in China, which has an impact on the later millennium.From the perspective of ancient Chinese history, I personally believe that the emergence of town heroes is also a kind of equilibrium.First, the emergence of town heroes is closely related to the lack of mobility in ancient Chinese villages.Due to the lack of mobility, the game between people has a long-term characteristic, which is conducive to moral cultivation.Because in the case of long-term game, the cost of individual violations is huge. In addition, due to the lack of mobility, information is scarce, which also provides a greater possibility for people with certain information resources to establish authority.Second, it is closely related to the economic basis of small-scale peasant economy.Because the agricultural surplus provided by small-scale peasant economy is limited, the state is bound to be unable to effectively guarantee the remuneration of a large number of officials.But the state cannot lack management. In this case, ancient Chinese society eventually realized the balance of management under the condition of insufficient management funds in the form of imperial power not lower than the county.Ancient China eventually realized the devolution of state power with the help of two forces.One is the power of the system, such as the system of criminal responsibility and the system of torture, which greatly activated the energy of mutual supervision and management among villagers.The other is the power of the villagers, that is, the villagers with prestige participate in the management, which not only saves the management cost, but also improves the management efficiency.Third, the cultural dynamics of the Chinese culture that attaches great importance to family affection and village affection is the cultural driving force for the birth of the villagers.But during the turbulent times, the villagers may be replaced by the local tyrants.Because in the turbulent times, due to the great increase in social instability, the stability of the village will be broken, and some villagers' short-term behavior will increase. In addition, in troubled times, in order to restore social order, the rulers will inevitably need the economy to provide a greater surplus, and to extract a greater surplus, it will inevitably lead to the tendency of management to exhaust the entire basin and fish, regardless of the consequences, which is easy to promote the growth of village management rogue local ruffians. OK, thank you, thank you.