美国针对富人的“社会主义”

by Joseph E. Stiglitz

Joseph E. Stiglitz

正当人们谈论金融危机复苏之际，美国的银行业同时在重新考虑如何加强监管。为了以防止另一次危机的发生，政治人物也在谈论如何改革监管规范。还有一个我们必须关注的领域——银行正在重整旗鼓，想要回复到往日的辉煌。

过去的体系对银行非常有利（虽然对股东是否有利就另说了），如此说来，他们为什么要改变呢？实际上，我们在危机后作出了的大量努力，但收效却甚微，银行比以前更没有竞争力，那些因为规模庞大而没法倒闭的银行变得规模更加庞大。

大家早就知道一个事实：美国银行不仅大的不能倒闭，而且如此庞大的规模也不利于管理。这也是他们一直经营不善的原因所在。每当他们运转失灵之时，政府就出面重组，提供存款信用保险，同时持有银行的股份。政府官员们深知，如果他们救援稍缓出台，那些“僵尸”或是濒临“僵尸”银行——几乎没有净资产，“死马”还被当作“活马”来医——为了自保，很有可能会放手一搏。如果冒险成功，他们自然会转危为安，如果失败，那就留给政府来“埋单”了。

这不仅仅是我们的想象，而是有前车之鉴。在1980年代时发生的储贷危机中，当时的ATM机没有“足够现金”，政府被迫出手救助，以避免资金枯竭导致存款人血本无归。在通常的金融重组中，股东一般承担损失所有的投资损失，而债券持有人往往成为新的股东。政府有可能提供额外的资金，而新的投资者必须接管倒闭的银行。

然而，奥巴马政府引入一个新的概念：过于庞大的银行不能进行重组。不能以常规的方法来治理这些规模庞大的银行。因为如果想要改组银行,市场会出现恐慌。所以说不仅不能碰债券人，甚至连股东都不能碰——所有的一切只能依赖于政府的救助计划。

我个人认为这个思路是错误的。奥巴马政府可能是在政治的压力和大银行的误导下作出的判断。他把救助银行和救助银行的股东和债权人混为一谈了。

  重组给了银行一个新生的机会：新的投资者（不论是资产抵押或是债券重组）将更有信心，其他银行也会乐于把资金借给他们。对于债券人来说。如果银行资产的实际价值比市场的价格要高，他们自然会得到补偿。由此而受益。

显而易见的是，奥巴马的战略在目前和将来成本都会很高——目前看来，他并没有实现预定的有限目标：那就是重新启动借贷活动。纳税人已经掏出了数百亿美元，而且很可能在将来掏出更多个百亿美元来担保。

重新改写市场经济的规则不仅仅是金融业蒙受到损失，获利者往往是那些金融危机的始作俑者。绝大多数的美国人认为这非常不公平，特别是他们看到银行接受到数百亿美元救助后，忙着给自己支付巨额的奖金和分红之后。撕毁社会合同不能如此的轻率。

如果采取如此的改革方案：也就是赚钱归个人，赔钱则由社会大众承担。这样的做法注定要失败。既然激励机制失灵了，哪里有什么市场游戏的规则可言？那些庞大到不能被重组的银行知道他们可以毫无顾忌地赌博——因为美联储提供利率几乎为零的资金，而资金可以源源不断地提供。

一些人把这种新的经济形式成为“美国式的社会主义”。但社会主义关注的是普通人的利益。与此相反的是，美国并没有给数百万失去家园的普通美国人提供帮助。失业的工人仅仅得到39个星期的有限失业救助，之后只能自谋出路。当他们失去了工作，同时也失去了健康医疗保险。

美国正在无休止地对公司提供安全保障，从商业银行到投资银行，然后是保险公司，现在是汽车行业，看来被救助的名单还远远没有完结。实际上，这不是社会主义，而是长期的公司福利主义的延伸。有钱有权的人可以伸手向政府求助，而普通大众却没什么社会保障。

我们必须拆分这些庞大而不能倒闭的银行。没有任何证据可以说明这些“金融怪兽”在接受救援后，会给社会大众带来任何好处。如果他们不被拆分，我们也要大大限制他们的权限。让他们不能还像过去那样为所欲为——赌博后的损失由其他人来承担。

对于这些金融怪兽来说，还有一个值得关注的问题：他们有着非常强大的政治势力。他们游说团的工作非常有效：先是减少监管，然后是纳税人来给他们收拾残局。正如他们所述求的那样，不顾纳税人和全球经济的死活，还想再一次地全身而退。这次，我们不能再让他们得逞。

Joseph E. Stiglitz

With all the talk of “green shoots” of economic recovery, America’s banks are pushing back on efforts to regulate them. While politicians talk about their commitment to regulatory reform to prevent a recurrence of the crisis, this is one area where the devil really is in the details – and the banks will muster what muscle they have left to ensure that they have ample room to continue as they have in the past.

The old system worked well for the bankers (if not for their shareholders), so why should they embrace change? Indeed, the efforts to rescue them devoted so little thought to the kind of post-crisis financial system we want that we will end up with a banking system that is less competitive, with the large banks that were too big too fail even larger.

It has long been recognized that those America’s banks that are too big to fail are also too big to be managed. That is one reason that the performance of several of them has been so dismal. Because government provides deposit insurance, it plays a large role in restructuring (unlike other sectors).  Normally, when a bank fails, the government engineers a financial restructuring; if it has to put in money, it, of course, gains a stake in the future. Officials know that if they wait too long, zombie or near zombie banks – with little or no net worth, but treated as if they were viable institutions – are likely to “gamble on resurrection.” If they take big bets and win, they walk away with the proceeds; if they fail, the government picks up the tab.

This is not just theory; it is a lesson we learned, at great expense, during the Savings & Loan crisis of the 1980’s. When the ATM machine says, “insufficient funds,” the government doesn’t want this to mean that the bank, rather than your account, is out of money, so it intervenes before the till is empty. In a financial restructuring, shareholders typically get wiped out, and bondholders become the new shareholders. Sometimes, the government must provide additional funds; sometimes it looks for a new investor to take over the failed bank.

The Obama administration has, however, introduced a new concept: too big to be financially restructured. The administration argues that all hell would break loose if we tried to play by the usual rules with these big banks. Markets would panic. So, not only can’t we touch the bondholders, we can’t even touch the shareholders – even if most of the shares’ existing value merely reflects a bet on a government bailout.

I think this judgment is wrong. I think the Obama administration has succumbed to political pressure and scare-mongering by the big banks. As a result, the administration has confused bailing out the bankers and their shareholders with bailing out the banks.

Restructuring gives banks a chance for a new start: new potential investors (whether in equity or debt instruments) will have more confidence, other banks will be more willing to lend to them, and they will be more willing to lend to others. The bondholders will gain from an orderly restructuring, and if the value of the assets is truly greater than the market (and outside analysts) believe, they will eventually reap the gains.

But what is clear is that the Obama strategy’s current and future costs are very high – and so far, it has not achieved its limited objective of restarting lending. The taxpayer has had to pony up billions, and has provided billions more in guarantees – bills that are likely to come due in the future.

Rewriting the rules of the market economy – in a way that has benefited those that have caused so much pain to the entire global economy – is worse than financially costly. Most Americans view it as grossly unjust, especially after they saw the banks divert the billions intended to enable them to revive lending to payments of outsized bonuses and dividends. Tearing up the social contract is something that should not be done lightly.

But this new form of ersatz capitalism, in which losses are socialized and profits privatized, is doomed to failure. Incentives are distorted. There is no market discipline. The too-big-to-be-restructured banks know that they can gamble with impunity – and, with the Federal Reserve making funds available at near-zero interest rates, there are ample funds to do so.

Some have called this new economic regime “socialism with American characteristics.” But socialism is concerned about ordinary individuals. By contrast, the United States has provided little help for the millions of Americans who are losing their homes. Workers who lose their jobs receive only 39 weeks of limited unemployment benefits, and are then left on their own. And, when they lose their jobs, most lose their health insurance, too.

America has expanded its corporate safety net in unprecedented ways, from commercial banks to investment banks, then to insurance, and now to automobiles, with no end in sight. In truth, this is not socialism, but an extension of long standing corporate welfarism. The rich and powerful turn to the government to help them whenever they can, while needy individuals get little social protection.

We need to break up the too-big-to-fail banks; there is no evidence that these behemoths deliver societal benefits that are commensurate with the costs they have imposed on others. And, if we don’t break them up, then we have to severely limit what they do. They can’t be allowed to do what they did in the past – gamble at others’ expenses.

This raises another problem with America’s too-big-to-fail, too-big-to-be-restructured banks: they are too politically powerful. Their lobbying efforts worked well, first to deregulate, and then to have taxpayers pay for the cleanup. Their hope is that it will work once again to keep them free to do as they please, regardless of the risks for taxpayers and the economy. We cannot afford to let that happen.

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