投资界期待了很久的巴菲特致股东的信终于新鲜出炉了。大家都希望听到他对经济形势和投资策略的看法。但是，显然巴菲特越来越谨言慎行了，他不厌其烦地细心地介绍了伯克希尔的各项生意，希望你自己去体会他对未来的看法。
在信件的开始部分，巴菲特照样是把旗下最大的业务-GEICO保险公司的CEO托尼大夸了一通，这是为伯克希尔公司提供现金流的最重要部门。巴菲特对GEICO2006的业绩非常满意。
2006年，巴菲特在非保险业务的收入增长了38%。在投资方面，他表示已经更多地关注海外市场，并开始采取实质行动了。Last year we had a good increase in non-insurance earnings – 38%. Large gains from here on in, though, will come only if we are able to make major, and sensible, acquisitions. That will not be easy. We do, however, have one advantage: More and more, Berkshire has become “the buyer of choice” for business owners and managers. Initially, we were viewed that way only in the U.S. (and more often than not by private companies). We’ve long wanted, nonetheless, to extend Berkshire’s appeal beyond U.S. borders. And last year, our globe-trotting finally got underway.
在并购方面，年初，伯克希尔耗资60亿美金完成了其中三项2005年启动的并购项目（PacifiCorp, Business Wire and Applied Underwriters），巴菲特饶有兴趣地讲了出资40亿美金收购以色列ISCAR80%股份的故事。这是伯克希尔第一次并购海外的实业资产。
这是个典型的巴菲特式并购过程：ISCAR传真过来一张A4纸，写着与出售的意愿和公司一些重要数据，然后双方见面沟通，巴菲特认为这是个值得信赖的他喜欢的管理团队，现场考察后更加深了巴菲特的印象，ISCAR由家族长期经营（和巴菲特买的其他实业一样），经营业绩优良。
The highlight of the year, however, was our July 5th acquisition of most of ISCAR, an Israeli
company, and our new association with its chairman, Eitan Wertheimer, and CEO, Jacob Harpaz. The
story here began on October 25, 2005, when I received a 1¼-page letter from Eitan, of whom I then knew nothing. The letter began, “I am writing to introduce you to ISCAR,” and proceeded to describe a cuttingtool business carried on in 61 countries. Then Eitan wrote, “We have for some time considered the issues of generational transfer and ownership that are typical for large family enterprises, and have given much thought to ISCAR’s future. Our conclusion is that Berkshire Hathaway would be the ideal home for ISCAR. We believe that ISCAR would continue to thrive as a part of your portfolio of businesses.”
Overall, Eitan’s letter made the quality of the company and the character of its management leap
off the page. It also made me want to learn more, and in November, Eitan, Jacob and ISCAR’s CFO,
Danny Goldman, came to Omaha. A few hours with them convinced me that if we were to make a deal, we would be teaming up with extraordinarily talented managers who could be trusted to run the business after a sale with all of the energy and dedication that they had exhibited previously. However, having never bought a business based outside of the U.S. (though I had bought a number of foreign stocks), I needed to get educated on some tax and jurisdictional matters. With that task completed, Berkshire purchased 80% of ISCAR for $4 billion. The remaining 20% stays in the hands of the Wertheimer family, making it our valued partner.
ISCAR’s products are small, consumable cutting tools that are used in conjunction with large and
expensive machine tools. It’s a business without magic except for that imparted by the people who run it. But Eitan, Jacob and their associates are true managerial magicians who constantly develop tools that make their customers’ machines more productive. The result: ISCAR makes money because it enables its customers to make more money. There is no better recipe for continued success.
ISCAR的产品是切割刀具，有很好的设计能力，能很好地满足客户需求，巴菲特唯一增加的一样工作是花些时间了解以色列的税务和法律事项，交易就成交了。原经营者继续留任。
同样的故事也发生在去年购买的TTI公司上，我发现不管巴菲特怎样地妙笔生花，他的并购故事总是一种模式。
巴菲特在信中表达了对资质好的需要巨额资金的项目（他称为ELEPHANT）的期待，显然，要保证取得良好的增长率，越来越庞大的资本是个不大不小的负担。伯克希尔的年度复合增长率一直随时间而耗减，对于巴菲特，为过多的资金寻找好的出路，是一项越来越艰巨的挑战。
伯克希尔有77个公司，除了保险业务之外，还有其他几个大类。
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations 制造/服务/零售
Earnings Statement (in millions)
2006 2005 2004
Revenues ................................................................................. $52,660 $46,896 $44,142
Operating expenses (including depreciation of $823 in 2006,
$699 in 2005 and $676 in 2004)....................................... 49,002 44,190 41,604
Interest expense ....................................................................... 132 83 57
Pre-tax earnings....................................................................... 3,526* 2,623* 2,481*
Income taxes and minority interests ........................................ 1,395 977 941
Net income .............................................................................. $ 2,131 $ 1,646 $ 1,540
巴菲特在报业分析上花了很多笔墨，旗下的布法罗日报利润下降，对报业有兴趣的朋友可以分享一下巴菲特的观点：
The industry’s staggering returns could be simply explained. For most of the 20th Century,
newspapers were the primary source of information for the American public. Whether the subject
was sports, finance, or politics, newspapers reigned supreme. Just as important, their ads were the
easiest way to find job opportunities or to learn the price of groceries at your town’s supermarkets.
在上世纪的大部分时间，报纸对美国公众来说是最基本的获取信息来源。
The great majority of families therefore felt the need for a paper every day, but understandably
most didn’t wish to pay for two. Advertisers preferred the paper with the most circulation, and
readers tended to want the paper with the most ads and news pages. This circularity led to a law
of the newspaper jungle: Survival of the Fattest. Thus, when two or more papers existed in a major city (which was almost universally the case a century ago), the one that pulled ahead usually emerged as the stand-alone winner. After competition disappeared, the paper’s pricing power in both advertising and circulation was unleashed. Typically, rates for both advertisers and readers would be raised annually – and the profits rolled in. For owners this was economic heaven. (Interestingly, though papers regularly –and often in a disapproving way – reported on the profitability of, say, the auto or steel industries, they never enlightened readers about their own Midas-like situation. Hmmm . . .)
报纸曾经拥有那么辉煌的经济权利.....
As long ago as my 1991 letter to shareholders, I nonetheless asserted that this insulated world was
changing, writing that “the media businesses . . . will prove considerably less marvelous than I, the
industry, or lenders thought would be the case only a few years ago.” Some publishers took
umbrage at both this remark and other warnings from me that followed. Newspaper properties,
moreover, continued to sell as if they were indestructible slot machines. In fact, many intelligent
newspaper executives who regularly chronicled and analyzed important worldwide events were
either blind or indifferent to what was going on under their noses. Now, however, almost all newspaper owners realize that they are constantly losing ground in the battle for eyeballs. Simply put, if cable and satellite broadcasting, as well as the internet, had come along first, newspapers as we know them probably would never have existed.
自从互联网出现之后,报纸就不再像以前那样了. 新的媒体时代开始了.
However, the economic potential of a newspaper internet site – given the many
alternative sources of information and entertainment that are free and only a click away – is at best
a small fraction of that existing in the past for a print newspaper facing no competition.
免费的多样化信息和娱乐是报纸最大的对手.
There’s no rule that says a newspaper’s revenues can’t fall below its expenses and that
losses can’t mushroom. Fixed costs are high in the newspaper business, and that’s bad news when unit volume heads south. As the importance of newspapers diminishes, moreover, the “psychic”
value of possessing one will wane, whereas owning a sports franchise will likely retain its cachet.
Unless we face an irreversible cash drain, we will stick with the News, just as we’ve said that we
would. (Read economic principle 11, on page 76.) Charlie and I love newspapers – we each read
five a day – and believe that a free and energetic press is a key ingredient for maintaining a great
democracy. We hope that some combination of print and online will ward off economic
doomsday for newspapers, and we will work hard in Buffalo to develop a sustainable business
model. I think we will be successful. But the days of lush profits from our newspaper are over.
尽管如此,巴菲特还是不放弃对报纸的爱,他愿意再试试,看能不能找到重新发动的引擎.
Investments 股票投资
这是巴菲特世界最令人着迷的部分了,但他从不多说,你只能从他的股票池变化中自己去揣摩了.
巴菲特拒绝透露两支正在交易中的股票(市值19亿美金),其他持有的股票如下,
12/31/06
Percentage of
Company Shares Company Owned Cost* Market
(in millions)
151,610,700 American Express Company ................... 12.6 $ 1,287 $ 9,198
36,417,400 Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc. ...................... 4.7 1,761 1,792
200,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company ........................ 8.6 1,299 9,650
17,938,100 Conoco Phillips ....................................... 1.1 1,066 1,291
21,334,900 Johnson & Johnson.................................. 0.7 1,250 1,409
6,708,760 M&T Bank Corporation .......................... 6.1 103 820
48,000,000 Moody’s Corporation .............................. 17.2 499 3,315
2,338,961,000 PetroChina “H” shares (or equivalents)... 1.3 488 3,313
3,486,006 POSCO.................................................... 4.0 572 1,158
100,000,000 The Procter & Gamble Company ............ 3.2 940 6,427
229,707,000 Tesco ....................................................... 2.9 1,340 1,820
31,033,800 US Bancorp ............................................. 1.8 969 1,123
17,072,192 USG Corp................................................ 19.0 536 936
19,944,300 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. .............................. 0.5 942 921
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company .............. 18.0 11 1,288
218,169,300 Wells Fargo & Company......................... 6.5 3,697 7,758
1,724,200 White Mountains Insurance..................... 16.0 369 999
Others ...................................................... 5,866 8,315
Total Common Stocks ............................. $22,995 $61,533
巴菲特的外汇业务
Total Gain (Loss) in Millions
Australian dollar $247.1 Mexican peso $106.1
British pound 287.2 New Zealand dollar 102.6
Canadian dollar 398.3 Singapore dollar (2.6)
Chinese yuan (12.7) South Korean won 261.3
Euro 839.2 Swiss franc 9.6
Hong Kong dollar (2.5) Taiwan dollar (45.3)
Japanese yen 1.9 Miscellaneous options 22.9