1183978 前两天读到纽约时报的国际版国际先驱论坛报这篇文章，信手翻译了前两部分如下，邹蓝。
December 2, 2010
纽约时报/国际先驱论坛报International Herald Tribune 2010年12月2日
讨论：中国的大学文凭价值何在？What Is a College Degree Worth in China?
根据最新的统计，中国的大学毕业生平均月薪只是比民工多300元，或者是44美元左右。近年来，大学毕业生的薪水一直在每月1500元上下。而民工的工资则上升到平均为1200元。
According to recent statistics, the average Chinese college graduate makes only 300 yuan, or about $44, more a month than the average Chinese migrant worker. In recent years, the wages of college graduates have remained steady at about 1,500 yuan a month. Migrant workers' wages, however, have risen to 1,200 yuan.
如果中国的大学毕业生无法从昂贵的教育投资中获益，那么获取一个大学的文凭对于高中毕业生来说是否值得就是问题了。这个失衡说明了中国的教育体制与经济的什么问题？
If China's graduates are unable to capitalize on their costly investment in education, then is it worthwhile for students to obtain a college degree? What does the imbalance say about China's education system and its economy in general?
黄亚生在该讨论中，于12月4日表示：改革私营部门
黄亚生是麻省理工学院斯隆管理学院的国际管理学教授，他著有“有中国特色的资本主义”一书。
Reform the Private Sector
Updated December 4, 2010, 12:15 AM
Yasheng Huang is professor of international management at Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is the author of “Capitalism With Chinese Characteristics.”
中国的高等教育扩张，经常与大学毕业生不太怎么样的收入相提并论。不过从供给方面的解释，善意说是不充分的，恶意说则是误导的。
1998年中国大学招生人数约100万，2008年这个数字是600万多。供给学派的解释假定1998年的数字正合适，而随后的扩张超越了中国经济发展的需求。
The expansion of China's higher education system has frequently been mentioned in connection to the lackluster earnings of its college graduates. But the supply-side explanation is at best incomplete and at worst misleading.
In 1998, China enrolled about one million college students; in 2008 this figure was more than six million. The supply-side explanation assumes that the 1998 enrollment number was just right and that subsequent expansion outpaced the needs of the Chinese economy.
大多数“生产知识”的活动发生在研究机构，它们只需要少量的员工；而在企业，则可能需要许多大学毕业生。更重要的是在需求方面。尽管外国分析家对于中国的发展有许多言论说法，中国经济的增长依然主要靠体力劳动、靠廉价和低水平的制造业来驱动。
Most 'knowledge production' takes place in research institutes, which require very few workers, rather than in companies, which would absorb many graduates. The more important part of the story lies on the demand side. Despite all the hoopla that foreign analysts have heaped on China’s growth, the economy remains driven by manual labor, low-cost and low-margin manufacturing.
中国目前以惊人的速度在生产知识，不过大多数的知识生产出自研究机构和学术机构，而不是出自企业。知识生产需要的是少量的精英，杰出而人数很少的职工。因此，这类机构无法吸收大量大学毕业生。
While China is currently producing knowledge at an impressive rate, the vast majority of the knowledge production takes place in research institutes and academic institutions, rather than in firms. Knowledge production requires an elite but an extraordinarily small number of workers. As a result, it cannot absorb many college graduates.
对大学毕业生有需求的另外一个渠道是政府机构。不过中国已经有了全球最大的官僚机器之一，如果不是最大，也是最大的之一。基数已经大到难以再增大了。事实上，现在中国的大学毕业生几百人甚至几千人竞争获得一个公务员的职位。
The next source of demand for college graduates is government agencies, but China already has one of the largest -- if not the largest -- bureaucracy in the world. The base is already so big that it is unlikely to grow even more. In fact, now hundreds and even thousands of Chinese college graduates compete with one another fiercely for one civil service position.
至于中国的企业界，这不是一个能对大学毕业生产生大量需求的部门。中国固然也在研发上耗费巨资，但是研发多集中在政府背景的研究机构，而不是在企业层面上进行的。而企业中雇佣大学毕业生的部门，多与融资，市场，人力资源管理等功能相关。
As for China’s corporate sector, it is also not a huge source of demand for college graduates. Although China spends a lot of money on research and development, most of that spending takes place within government-sponsored research institutions, not within firms. The part of the corporate sector that employs college graduates has to do with finance, marketing and human resource management functions.
中国企业“头轻”，意思就是他们雇佣不少劳工，但是很少的经理，而服务部门很弱。原因在于许多中国的企业，实际上就是工厂。他们得到出口订单以及产品规格，然后就根据这些来加工生产。他们无需大事自己的市场营销和产品开发。
Chinese firms are 'top-light' -- they have a lot of workers but few managers -- and the service sector is very weak.However, Chinese firms are extremely "top-light" -- that is, they have many workers but very few managers. The reason is that many of the Chinese firms are really factories. They receive export contracts and specifications and then they produce products accordingly. There is very little need for them to do their own marketing and product development.
最后，服务业是中国经济的阿基里斯之踵。服务业很弱很小，与GDP的比重来说，比印度，美国，日本和欧洲国家都低得多。中国的服务业在GDP的比重，只相当于中东国家水准而低于正常经济的水平。
Finally, the service sector is the Achilles’ heels of the Chinese economy. It is very weak and small, much lower, in terms of ratio to G.D.P., than India, United States, Japan and European countries. In fact, China’s service sector -- in relationship to G.D.P. -- makes China closer to oil producing countries in the Middle East rather than to any normal economy.
中国企业之所以没有雇佣较多管理人员，以及服务业很不发达，原因非常复杂，不过都与中国私营部门遭遇的扭曲的金融管理环境有关。
The reasons for the managerial underdevelopment of Chinese corporate sector and its small service sector are very complex but they all have to do with a distorted financial regulatory environment faced by Chinese private-sector firms.
中国的大学毕业生仅仅是在相对于私营部门的欠发展的前提下供应“过剩”，除非中国采取大胆的改革措施，否则这种状况很难改变。
The supply of Chinese college graduates is only “excessive” relative to the underdevelopment of its private sector and there is little possibility for change unless China undertakes bold reforms.