By Nicholas Brady 2010-01-12
There is an inexorable drive on both sides of the Atlantic to finalise new rules, regulations and laws to place the financial system on a sounder footing. But in their zeal to act, politicians and regulators are looking through the wrong end of the telescope. Too much attention is being paid to maintaining a status quo that allows banks to continue engaging in the full range of activities to which they have become accustomed – admittedly under a number of regulatory constraints – without dealing with the fundamental causes of today's critical difficulties.
Policymakers are intent on announcing all manner of new capital requirements, leverage ratios, “living wills” and directives on risk management, while brushing aside warnings by both Mervyn King, the governor of the Bank of England, and former US Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker that our banking system is unsound. Mr King and Mr Volcker are not alone in their concern that we may now miss a unique opportunity to secure core reforms.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision – the key multilateral authority on setting financial rules – dumped an 88-page present on governments and banks just before Christmas and, true to form, its focus was on technical ratios designed to force banking stability. The US House of Representatives last month voted for regulatory reform legislation that is no better. The House fails to consider the distinction between things that are critical and things that are merely important. The same mistake seems likely from the European Union, which is in the throes of establishing three new regulatory authorities.
The safety and soundness of the financial system is indisputably essential; without it, we have nothing. The long history of financial collapses proves this point. While efficiency, creativity and credit availability are important, they cannot be allowed to trump safety and soundness.
“Too big to fail” is the mantra of the day, but this mischaracterises the problem. The larger an institution, if soundly based, the more credit it can provide. What is of primary importance is the bank's combination of activities. This is a key question that needs to be asked. It is not addressed, for example, in the House's legislation or in the proposals sent to Congress by the Obama administration.
It is not too late to give centre stage to the question: should a bank's operations include activities that could create a combustible mix and threaten the system as a whole?
I believe it is unsound for banking institutions to have the right to go to the Federal Reserve while pursuing lines of business that could result in such a combustible mix. Formulas that restrain such volatile operations – as are now being put forward on both sides of the Atlantic – will lead only to endless definitional arguments between the regulators and the industry. It is delusional to think that a regulatory system can be based on formulas – either the investment bankers will outwit the regulators or the regulators will overreact.
The architects of the new laws and regulations have been so focused on the financial institutions that they have lost sight of individual depositors. Everyone, however, has a relationship with a bank, while the average person has no interaction with the so-called shadow financial institutions. That is why there are 220,000 people working at JPMorgan Chase and only 31,000 employees at Goldman Sachs. Banks are the one place where the ordinary citizen touches the financial system. That citizen wants to be certain that he or she is dealing with an institution that is safe and sound.
It was this logic that ensured a clear separation in the US Banking Act of 1933 between deposit-taking commercial banks and the speculative investment banking business. I am not suggesting that we reinstate Glass- Steagall: underwriting activities are sufficiently refined so as to pose a much lower risk to the system than in Senator Glass's day.
What I do suggest is a philosophy: do not allow the banking industry to create a combustible mix that will contaminate America's central banking system. We will bitterly regret it if we fail to divide deposit-based banks from the shadow banking system.
There are a variety of means by which a fundamental restructuring of banking can be accomplished. The aim is to ensure, on the one hand, that institutions enjoying access to central bank windows and where deposits are governmentally insured operate in the safest manner, in the full interest of those whose deposits they take and whose businesses they provide with credit; and, on the other hand, that institutions engaged in speculative trading are subject to the vagaries and risks of the marketplace, subject of course to a precautionary range of regulations.
So far, politicians and regulators have ignored the fundamental issues, pursuing quick fixes rather than challenging the status quo. However, I do not believe it is too late to reopen the debate. We must start with fundamentals and the core interests of the public if we are to ensure that we will not stand condemned in the future for failing to learn from the mistakes of the past.
The writer, a former US Treasury secretary and senator, is chairman of Darby Overseas Investments Limited and a principal of Holowesko Partners
金融监管改革应从核心问题着手
作者：前美国财政部长 尼古拉斯?布雷迪 为英国《金融时报》撰稿 2010-01-12
为了巩固金融体系的基础，大西洋两岸都拿出了不可阻挡的劲头，试图制定新的规则、监管规定和法律。但行动热情高涨的政治家和监管者正从望远镜的错误一端看问题。他们太过强调维持现状，使得银行能够继续从事自己所习惯的全套业务——当然，是要受到一些监管方面的限制——而未从根源上解决当前最紧要的问题。
政策制定者有意出台各种新规，包括资本金要求、杠杆比率、“生前遗嘱”以及风险管理指令，却对英国央行(BoE)行长默文?金(Mervyn King)及前美联储(Fed)主席保罗?沃尔克(Paul Volcker)关于银行体系根基不稳的警告置之不理。金和沃尔克担心，我们可能错失推行关键改革的唯一机会。有此担心的不止他们两人。
就在圣诞节前，作为在制定金融业规则方面起关键作用的多边机构，巴塞尔银行监管委员会(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision)向各国政府与银行抛出了一份88页的“礼物”。和往常一样，该文件聚焦于旨在力保银行业稳定的技术性比率。美国众议院上月投票通过的监管改革法案也同样不尽人意。众议院未能考虑到“关键”问题与“仅仅是重要”问题之间的区别。欧盟也可能犯同样的错误——它正忙着创建三家新的监管机构。
金融体系的安全与稳健具有无可争辩的必要性；失去它们，我们就会失去一切，金融崩盘的历史就是例证。效率、创造力和信贷可得性(credit availability)固然重要，但不应凌驾在安全与稳健之上。
“大到不能倒”是眼下流行的说法，但它错误地描述了问题的特性。对根基稳健的机构来说，规模越大，其能够提供的信贷就越多。银行的业务构成才是最重要的。这是必须要问的一个关键问题，而这个问题尚未得到解决。举例来说，众议院法案和奥巴马政府递交国会的议案就没有给出解决办法。
银行业务是否应该包括那些可能形成危险组合继而危及整个体系的活动？现在重点讨论这个问题还为时不晚。
我认为，银行业机构一方面有权求助于美联储，另一方面却开展可能形成此类危险组合的业务，这是不妥当的。限制此类高风险业务的准则——大西洋两岸目前都有此类准则出炉——只会导致监管机构与银行业之间就定义展开无休止的争论。认为监管体系可建立在准则基础上是痴心妄想——要么投资银行家会耍花招绕过监管，要么监管者会反应过度。
新法规的设计者们是如此关注金融机构，以至于忽略了个人储户。但事实是，每个人都与银行发生着关系，而普通人是不会与所谓的影子金融机构打交道的。这就是为什么摩根大通(JPMorgan Chase)的雇员有22万人，而高盛(Goldman Sachs)只有3.1万人。银行是普通公民与金融体系打交道的唯一场所，他们希望确定，自己正与一家安全稳健的机构打交道。
正是这一逻辑，确保了美国《1933年银行法》(US Banking Act of 1933)做出明确隔离吸收存款的商业银行与投机性投行业务的规定。我不是在提议恢复《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》(Glass-Steagall Act)：承销业务目前已足够成熟，它对系统构成的风险比格拉斯参议员在世时要低得多。
我提议的是一种理念：不应允许银行业制造会毒害美国中央银行体系的危险组合。如果我们不把基于存款的银行与影子银行体系分开，我们终将后悔不已。
从根本上重组银行业的方式有很多。我们的目标是确保：一方面，有权获得央行窗口资金、所吸收存款由政府承保的机构，能以最安全且完全符合储户及贷款企业利益的方式运营；另一方面，由从事投机交易的机构来承担市场的不测与风险，当然，它们还要遵守一系列预防性的监管规定。
迄今为止，政治家与监管者忽视了根本问题，他们寻求的是权宜之计，而不是挑战现状。不过，我不认为现在重启辩论为时太晚。如果我们要确保一点，即自己不会因未能从过去的错误中吸取教训而在未来受到责难，那么我们必须从根本问题和公众的核心利益出发。
本文作者曾任美国财政部长和参议员，现任达比海外投资公司(Darby Overseas Investments Limited)董事长和Holowesko Partners负责人
译者/章晴